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Abstract
Recently, it has been shown how sampling actions from the predic-
tive distribution over the optimal action—sometimes called Thompson
sampling—can be applied to solve sequential adaptive control problems,
when the optimal policy is known for each possible environment. The
predictive distribution can then be constructed by a Bayesian superposi-
tion of the optimal policies weighted by their posterior probability that
is updated by Bayesian inference and causal calculus. Here we discuss
three important features of this approach. First, we discuss in how far
such Thompson sampling can be regarded as a natural consequence of the
Bayesian modeling of policy uncertainty. Second, we show how Thomp-
son sampling can be used to study interactions between multiple adaptive
agents, thus, opening up an avenue of game-theoretic analysis. Third, we
show how Thompson sampling can be applied to infer causal relationships
when interacting with an environment in a sequential fashion. In sum-
mary, our results suggest that Thompson sampling might not merely be a
useful heuristic, but a principled method to address problems of adaptive
sequential decision-making and causal inference.
1 Introduction
In a research paper from 1933, Thompson studied the problem of finding out
which one of two drugs was better when testing them on a patient population
under the constraint that as few people as possible should be subjected to the
inferior drug during the course of testing [1]. Given a current probability es-
timate P of one treatment being better than the other, he suggested that it
might be a good idea to adjust the proportions of future test subjects that take
the two drugs to the respective probabilities P and 1− P . This way one would
not run into the danger of permanently cutting off all future test subjects from
a potentially superior treatment that so far seems inferior due to statistical
fluctuations, while only temporarily risking exposure to a potentially inferior
drug for a smaller proportion of the population. Randomizing actions based on
the probability that this action is believed to be optimal when faced with an
unknown environment is now sometimes called Thompson sampling.
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Thompson sampling is a form of probability matching. Probability match-
ing has been extensively studied in both humans and animals when they make
predictions in stochastic environments [2, 3]. Rather than consistently predict-
ing the most likely outcome, experimental subjects tend to randomize their
predictions based on the probabilities with which the respective events occur.
When knowing the probabilities, this is clearly a suboptimal strategy. However,
in the case of Thompson sampling it is important to note that the probabili-
ties are not known. Nevertheless, one might argue that Thompson sampling is
a suboptimal strategy, as Thompson’s problem can be thought of as a bandit
problem [4], which is solved optimally by Gittin’s indices in the case of known
prior probabilities and discounted rewards [5]. Most studies have therefore ex-
amined Thompson sampling as a heuristic in the context of bandit problems
[6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16].
Recently, it was shown, however, that Thompson sampling can also be ap-
plied to solve a more general class of sequential adaptive control problems,
provided that both an optimal policy and a predictive model is known for each
possible environment [17]. When an environment is drawn randomly from the
set of possible environments, the optimal policy can then be inferred on the fly
by an adaptation process that is driven by actions sampled from the predic-
tive distribution over the optimal policies. Here we study three characteristic
features of such generalized Thompson sampling. First, we discuss in how far
Thompson sampling can be regarded as a natural consequence of a Bayesian
treatment of policy uncertainty. Second, we study convergence behavior when
two adaptive Thompson sampling agents are coupled in a sequential fashion.
Third, we show how this approach can be extended naturally to address the
problem of causal induction when interacting with an unknown environment.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we clarify the problem
statement and recapitulate the main result of [17]. In Section 3 we analyze
the uncertainty faced by agents that are unable to compute the single best
policy. In Section 4 we study interactions that arise when coupling two adaptive
agents that employ Thompson sampling to determine their actions. In Section 5
we investigate how this approach can be applied to adaptive agents that need
to discover the causal structure of their environment. Finally, we discuss in
what sense Thompson sampling might provide a principled solution to adaptive
decision-making problems.
2 Problem Statement
2.1 Preliminaries
We restrict the exposition to the case of discrete time with discrete stochastic
observations and actions. LetO andA be two finite sets, the first being the set of
observations and the second being the set of actions. We use a≤t := a1a2 . . . at
and a<t := a1a2 . . . at−1 to simplify the notation of strings. We define the set
of interactions as Z := A × O. The set of interaction strings of length t ≥ 0
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is denoted by Zt. The set of all finite interaction strings is Z∗ := ⋃t≥0Zt, the
set of infinite strings is Z∞ := {w : w = a1o1a2o2 . . .}. The interaction string
of length 0 is denoted by ǫ.
Agents and environments are formalized as I/O systems. An I/O system
Pr is a probability distribution over interaction sequences Z∞. Pr is uniquely
determined by the conditional probabilities
Pr(at|a<t, o<t), Pr(ot|a≤t, o<t)
for each a1o1 . . . at−1ot−1at ∈ Z∗. An interaction system (P,Q) is a coupling
of two I/O systems, where P is an agent and Q is an environment. Because
the agent and the environment mutually influence each other, their actions
and observations are conditioned by the previous interactions. Accordingly, the
probability of an interaction string a1o1 . . . aT oT is given by
T∏
t=1
P (at|a<t, o<t)Q(ot|a≤t, o<t). (1)
From the point of view of the agent P , the distribution P (at|a<t, o<t) is a
policy and captures the probability of producing action at ∈ A given history
a1o1 . . . at−1ot−1. The distribution P (ot|a≤t, o<t) is the agent’s predictive model
of the environment, as it predicts the probability of the observation ot ∈ O given
history a1o1 . . . at−1ot−1at. For the agent P , the sequence o1o2 . . . provides its
input stream and the sequence a1a2 . . . is its output stream. In the case of the
environment Q the roles are reversed, that is the sequence o1o2 . . . is its output
stream and the sequence a1a2 . . . provides its input stream. The quintessential
goal is to choose the agent’s policy such that the resulting distribution over the
interaction sequences (1) is desirable.
2.2 Policy Construction: Known Environment
If Q is known, then P can be equipped with a model that can perfectly predict
its environment, that is P (ot|a≤t, o<t) = Q(ot|a≤t, o<t) for all a1o1 . . . at ∈ Z∗.
Moreover, a custom-made policy can be designed for P that produces desir-
able interaction sequences. Desirability is typically formalized by the economic
theory of subjective expected utility (SEU) [18, 19], which stipulates that a
decision maker’s preferences over lotteries can be thought of as maximizing a
SEU of the outcome. In the policy construction setting, this translates into the
designer having a real-valued utility function giving rise to utilities U(a1:T , o1:T )
for each realization, and the predictive model P (ot|a≤t, o<t). The utility func-
tion quantifies the subjective desirability of a particular interaction string and
the probabilities represent the subjective model of the environment. The max-
imum expected utility principle then states that the designer has to choose the
policy such that it maximizes the expected utility
EP [U ] :=
∑
a≤T ,o≤T
P (a≤T , o≤T )U(a≤T , o≤T )
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where the probabilities P (a≤T , o≤T ) are the policy-prediction products
T∏
t=1
P (at|a<t, o<t)P (ot|a≤t, o<t)
=
{ T∏
t=1
P (at|a<t, o<t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
policy
}{ T∏
t=1
P (ot|a≤t, o<t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
prediction
}
. (2)
The optimal policy is often computed by restating the problem recursively and
then using dynamic programming to solve the Belmann optimality equations
[20]. The policy and the prediction model are both subjective in the sense that
they are unilaterally chosen by the designer. A policy choice explainable by this
scheme is defined to be a rational choice. Choices that do not strictly obey the
maximum SEU principle are irrational, or at best bounded rational [21].
2.3 Policy Construction: Unknown Environment
In general, the prediction model will not be equal to the generative law of the
environment, that is,
P (ot|a≤t, o<t) 6= Q(ot|a≤t, o<t).
and consequently the true expected utility is in general not equal to the SEU:
EPr[U ] 6= EP [U ]. (3)
One of the most interesting cases where the prediction model and the true
generative law of the environment do not match is when the designer is uncertain
about the latter. Formally, the designer expresses his uncertainty by introducing
a random variable θ that indexes the class of potential environments Qθ. More
specifically, he has a class of prediction models and policies
B(ot|θ, a≤t, o<t), B(at|θ, a<t, o<t), (4)
such that for every possible environment indexed by θ there is a perfectly fit-
ting predictor B(ot|θ, a≤t, o<t) = Qθ(ot|a≤t, o<t) and a desirable custom-built
policy B(at|θ, a<t, o<t). Moreover, the designer believes that Qθ is drawn with
probability B(θ) from a set Θ of possible environments before the interaction
starts, where Θ is assumed to be discrete for simplicity.
2.3.1 Decision-theoretic Problem Formulation
In order to stay within the framework of subjective expected utility one has
to reduce the problem of the unknown environment to a problem with known
environment. Such a “known” environment can be created from a set of pos-
sible environments as a new “super-environment” by marginalizing over the
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parameter of the possible environments, thus, obtaining the Bayesian mixture
distribution [22]
B(o≤T |a≤T ) =
∑
θ
B(θ)B(o≤T |θ, a≤T )
=
∑
θ
B(θ)
T∏
t=1
B(ot|θ, a≤t, o<t).
The adaptive control problem is then solved by equating the prediction model
P with the Bayesian predictive distribution over the observations,
P (ot|a≤t, o<t) := B(ot|a≤t, o<t),
and then choosing the policy that maximizes the SEU as in the case of a known
environment. This procedure effectively enlarges the space of possible environ-
ments to the convex hull H(Θ) spanned by the prediction models in Θ, i.e. an
“environment” is any convex combination of distributions indexed by θ. Each
θ ∈ H(Θ) thus corresponds to a Bayesian mixture over the environments in Θ,
but with a different prior. If the true generative law coincides with one of the
models, i.e. there is a θ∗ ∈ Θ such that
Q(ot|a≤t, o<t) = B(ot|θ∗, a≤t, o<t), (5)
then the predictive model will converge to the true generative law with Pr-
probability one, that is
P (ot|a≤t, o<t)→ Q(ot|θ∗, a≤t, o<t)
as t→∞. Since the policy choice is optimal, this scheme directly bypasses the
exploration-exploitation dilemma [23]. The important point, however, is that
in order to express the uncertainty over the environment’s probability law, the
designer had to introduce a belief model that compiles into an actual predic-
tion model. Thus, the policy construction in the SEU problem statement for
unknown environments proceeds in two steps: first, a Bayesian mixture environ-
ment is created, and second a utility-maximizing policy is found on this mixture
environment.
2.3.2 Probabilistic Problem Formulation
An alternative formulation of the problem statement for unknown environments
is a one-step procedure that essentially stays within (Bayesian) probability cal-
culus. In this case actions are treated as random variables and our goal is to
determine a distribution P (at|aˆ<t, o<t) that tells us how to act depending on
past actions aˆ<t and past observations o<t. The distribution P (at|aˆ<t, o<t)
is the pendant to the observational distribution P (ot|aˆ≤t, o<t) used for predic-
tion. The only caveat is that past probabilistic actions, unlike past observations,
have to be marked as causal interventions—denoted by ◦ˆ in causal calculus [24].
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Given the models (4), both distributions can then be expressed as mixture dis-
tributions
P (ot|aˆ≤t, o<t) =
∑
θ
B(ot|θ, a≤t, o<t)B(θ|aˆ≤t, o<t)
P (at|aˆ<t, o<t) =
∑
θ
B(at|θ, a<t, o<t)B(θ|aˆ<t, o<t),
where the posterior is given by
B(θ|aˆ<t, o<t) = B(ot−1|θ, a<t−1, o<t−1)B(θ|aˆ<t−1, o<t−1)∑
θ′ B(ot−1|θ′, a<t−1, o<t−1)B(θ′|aˆ<t−1, o<t−1)
.
Sampling from P (at|aˆ<t, o<t) is equivalent to sampling a random belief θ from
the posterior B(θ|aˆ<t, o<t) and then acting according to B(at|θ, a<t, o<t). This
corresponds to a generalized Thompson sampling procedure, where first a ran-
dom belief is sampled and then the optimal policy with respect to this belief
is executed. Effectively, the posterior is also the only place where causal calculus
plays a role, as can be seen by the absence of the likelihoodB(aˆt−1|θ, a<t−1, o<t−1),
which is equal to one. Intuitively, the reason for this is that the agent can be
surprised about his past observations and learn from them, but he cannot be
surprised about his own actions chosen by himself in the past. Past actions do
not provide any information about the environment. As will be explained in
more detail below, causal calculus deals exactly with inference problems when
some random variables are intervened or set by the inference machine itself. Im-
portantly, this result is obtained solely by applying basic probability and causal
calculus.
3 Policy Uncertainty
While subjective expected utility is formally appealing as a principle for the
construction of adaptive agents, its strict application is in practice often prob-
lematic. This is mainly due to two reasons:
1. Computational complexity. The computations required to find the opti-
mal solution (for instance, the computational complexity of solving the
Bellman optimality equations) are prohibitive in general and scale expo-
nentially with the length of the horizon: the time complexity of the search
algorithm is O(|A × O|T ). The problem is tractable only in very special
cases under assumptions that reduce the effective size of the problem.
2. Causal precedence of policy choice. The choice of the policy has to be made
before the interaction with the environment starts. That is, an agent has
to have a unique optimal policy before it has even interacted once with
the environment. An optimal policy constructed by the maximum SEU
principle is therefore a very risky bet, as a lot of resources have to be spent
before any evidence exists that the underlying model or prior is adequate.
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Because of these two reasons, it is practically often impossible or questionable
to apply the maximum SEU principle. In the following, we investigate how to
weaken the formal assumptions of the policy construction method.
3.1 Policy search
Given a problem specification in terms of the predictive model and the util-
ity function, the task of a policy search method is to calculate a policy that
approximates the optimal policy.
More specifically, let π be a parameter in a set Π indexing the set of candidate
policies
B(at|π, a<t, o<t) (6)
analogous to the prediction models (4) indexed by θ ∈ Θ. Then, in the most gen-
eral case, a policy search method returns a probability distribution B(π) over Π
representing the uncertainty over the optimal policy parameters. If the algo-
rithm solves the maximum SEU problem, then the support of this distribution
will exclusively cover the set of optimal policies Π∗ ⊂ Π. Otherwise there re-
mains uncertainty over the optimal policy parameters.
Policies can also be parameterized in terms of the predictive model. In
particular, we will assume that for each θ ∈ Θ there is a known optimal policy
π ∈ Π, such that one can construct a function b : Θ → Π that maps each
θ into some π ∈ Π. Uncertainty over the environment can then directly be
translated into policy uncertainty, such that any point in the convex hull H(Θ)
can be mapped to a corresponding point in the convex hull H(Π) spanned by
the policies π ∈ Π.
3.2 The Exploration-Exploitation Trade-Off
Many policy search methods do not explicitly deal with the uncertainty over
the policy parameters. Some methods only return a point estimate πˆ ∈ Π. It
is obvious that the greedy usage of the estimate πˆ leads to sub-optimal perfor-
mance, since for all πˆ that are not in the set Π∗ of optimal policies, one has
that
EB[U |π∗] > EB[U |πˆ]
where
EB[U |π] =
∑
a≤T ,o≤T
B(a≤T , o≤T |π)U(a≤T , o≤T )
is the SEU with respect to the policy parameter π ∈ Π. For instance, reinforce-
ment learning algorithms [4] start from a randomly initialized point estimate
πˆ0 of the optimal policy and then generate refined point estimates πˆ1, πˆ2, πˆ3, . . .
in each time step t = 1, 2, 3, . . . using the data provided by experience. In
order to converge to the optimal policy, these algorithms have to deal with
the exploration-exploitation trade-off. This means that the agents cannot just
greedily act according to these point estimates; instead, they have to produce
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explorative actions as well, that is, actions that deviate from the current esti-
mate of the optimal policy—for instance producing optimistic actions based on
UCB [25, 26].
Let Bt(π) denote the posterior distribution over the optimal policy at time
t. Then,
Bt(π) = Bt(b(θ)) = Bt(b
−1(π)),
where b−1(π) ⊂ Θ is the pre-image of π. Hence, this shows that finding the
optimal policy amounts to finding the pre-image of π∗, such that the distribution
over the policy space becomes the delta function
Bt(π) =
{
1 if θ∗ ∈ b−1(π),
0 else
where θ∗ ∈ Θ is the true prediction model defined in (5). This highlights the
essence of the exploration-exploitation trade-off: any action issued by the agent
has to respect the uncertainty over the policy parameter—otherwise they are
biased. In particular, if the agent acts greedily (i.e. it treats the estimate πˆ as if
it were the true policy parameter) then it is overfitting the experience; likewise,
an agent having excessive uncertainty is underfitting. From a frequentist point
of view, this reveals that the exploration-exploitation trade-off is nothing else
but the bias-variance trade-off [27] in policy space. This suggests that just like
Bayesian modeling naturally balances the bias-variance trade-off by creating es-
timators that are probability distributions instead of point estimates, Bayesian
modeling of the exploration-exploitation trade-off leads to a Bayes-causal solu-
tion for generalized Thompson sampling.
3.3 Bayes-Causal Solution
It is important to note that the concept of the bias is conditional on the true
parameter—which is unknown when the designer is uncertain about the envi-
ronment. This is not a problem from a Bayesian point of view, because the
best estimator of the policy parameter is its posterior distribution [28]. Hence,
instead of dealing with the exploration-exploitation dilemma by introducing ex-
plorative actions, one can directly use the posterior distribution over the policy
parameter as an estimate.
To see how to do this, note that, by virtue of the mapping π = b(θ), the poli-
cies are independent of the policy parameter when the environment parameter
is known:
B(at|b(θ), a<t, o<t) = B(at|θ, a<t, o<t).
Hence, each θ ∈ Θ indexes a dynamical model given by the distributions over
interaction sequences
B(a≤T , o≤T |θ) =
T∏
t=1
B(at|θ, a<t, o<t)B(ot|θ, a≤t, o<t).
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Given the dynamical models and their prior probabilities, the designer can form
the Bayesian mixture model
B(a≤T , o≤T ) =
∑
θ
B(θ)B(a≤T , o≤T |θ) (7)
where the sum spans all the parameters in Θ. The mixture models in H(Θ) \Θ
need not be considered here, since it is assumed that θ∗ ∈ Θ.
Actions as Causal Interventions
The designer can directly use the probabilistic model (7) to characterize an agent
with policy uncertainty. There is a caveat though when actions are treated as
random variables. It is clear that the observations produced by the environment
update the agent’s state of knowledge about the environment. However, the
actions are set by the agent itself and hence they do not provide information
about the environment.
The theory that deals with the distinction between exogenous and endoge-
nous information is statistical causality [29, 30]. Observations change the infor-
mation state by regular Bayesian conditioning, whereas actions constitute causal
interventions followed by Bayesian conditioning. To calculate the effect of an
intervention, the causal model, i.e. the unique factorization of the joint distri-
bution into conditional probabilities matching the causal dependencies over the
random variables, is required to be known. In our setup, this is straightforward:
first, the environment secretly chooses a true parameter θ∗ ∈ Θ, and then the
interactions a1, o1, a2, o2, . . . follow chronologically.
Formally, this means that the posterior probabilities over the environment
parameters are given by
B(θ|aˆ<t, o<t)
rather than the more familiar expressionB(θ|a<t, o<t), where the “hat”-notation
aˆt denotes a causal intervention [31].
For our needs, it is enough to consider the following simple method to cal-
culate the effect of causal interventions:
1. Expand the probabilities in terms of the joint distribution.
2. Rewrite the joint distribution as the causal factorization.
3. Remove the intervention tags from the intervened random variables that
are in the probability conditions.
4. Replace each conditional probability having an intervened variable in the
argument by a delta function over its chosen value.
Applying these four steps to the posterior probabilities over the environment
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parameters yields
B(θ|aˆ<t, o<t)
(1.)
=
B(θ, aˆ<t, o<t)∑
θ′
B(θ′, aˆ<t, o<t)
(2.)
=
B(θ)
∏
t
k=1 B(aˆk|θ, aˆ<k, o<k)B(ok|θ, aˆ≤k, o<k)∑
θ′
B(θ′)
∏
t
k=1 B(aˆk|θ
′, aˆ<k, o<k)B(ok|θ′, aˆ≤k, o<k)
(3.)
=
B(θ)
∏
t
k=1 B(aˆk|θ, a<k, o<k)B(ok|θ, a≤k, o<k)∑
θ′
B(θ′)
∏
t
k=1 B(aˆk|θ
′, a<k, o<k)B(ok|θ′, a≤k, o<k)
(4.)
=
B(θ)
∏
t
k=1 B(ok|θ, a≤k, o<k)∑
θ′
B(θ′)
∏
t
k=1 B(ok|θ
′, a≤k, o<k)
. (8)
This equation shows that beliefs are updated only using the observations, and
that actions are treated “as if they were known beforehand”, thus providing no
evidence.
Likewise, note that
B(at|θ, aˆ<t, o<t) = B(at|θ, a<t, o<t). (9)
Using (8) and (9), we get the probability of issuing action at ∈ A:
B(at|aˆ<t, o<t) =
∑
θ
B(at|θ, a<t, o<t)B(θ|aˆ<t, o<t). (10)
The important fact about (10) is it was derived only from probability theory
and causal calculus by assuming policy uncertainty over a set of policies. We
can therefore define the policy and prediction models of the agent as
P (at|a<t, o<t) := B(at|aˆ<t, o<t)
P (ot|a≤t, o<t) := B(ot|aˆ≤t, o<t).
(11)
The construction of an adaptive agent with policy uncertainty then proceeds
analogous to a Bayesian inference process.
1. First, we define a set of prediction models B(ot|θ, a<t, o<t) and policy
models B(at|θ, a≤t, o<t), where each policy model is optimal for a partic-
ular environment θ. In the case of inference the latent random variable
θ ∈ Θ corresponds to the hypothesis.
2. Second, we choose some prior probabilities B(θ) to model our prior un-
certainty.
3. Third, we use the distribution B(at|aˆ<t, o<t) as the agent’s adaptive policy
P (at|a<t, o<t), and the distribution B(ot|aˆ≤t, o<t) as the agent’s adaptive
predictor P (ot|a≤t, o<t).
Thus, Thompson sampling is used in every time step to sample an action at
from the predictive distribution B(at|aˆ<t, o<t).
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4 Convergence & Co-Adaptation
In [17], the limit behavior of a Thompson sampling agent (11) was investigated.
Assuming that there exists a belief P (ot|θ, a≤t, o<t) that perfectly models the
environment Qθ such that P (ot|θ, a≤t, o<t) = Qθ(ot|a≤t, o<t), then the agent
(11) converges in the sense that P (at|a<t, o<t)→ P (at|θ, a<t, o<t) almost surely
as t→∞ if the interaction system (P,Q) fulfills certain ergodicity requirements
and all policies P (at|θ, a<t, o<t) are consistent. Roughly speaking, the first
requirement ensures that the agent can recover from any initial mistakes, and
the second requirement ensures that all predictors B(ot|θ, a≤t, o<t) that make
the same predictions for the tail of the observation sequence are coupled to the
same policy B(at|θ, a<t, o<t). Thus, the same beliefs imply the same behaviors.
But what happens if the environment is also adaptive? As long as the
agent has a model B(ot|θ, a≤t, o<t) that captures the adaptive behavior of the
environment nothing fundamentally changes. However, the agent might not
have a model about the adaptive behavior of the environment, while still having
a pretty good idea about the environment’s preferences. This is typically the
case in game theory [32, 33], where the agent knows the other agent’s best
response function, but has no model of the other agent’s adaptive behavior. In
the simplest one-shot simultaneous move games the best response functions are
given by
BR1[Q(o)] = argmax
P (a)
∑
a,o
P (a)Q(o)U(a, o)
BR2[P (a)] = argmax
Q(o)
∑
a,o
P (a)Q(o)V (a, o),
where player 1’s best response BR1 is a distribution P (a) over actions a that
depends on agent 2’s probability Q(o) of emitting o, and where U and V
are the payoff functions for player 1 and 2 respectively. A Nash equilibrium
(P ∗(a), Q∗(o)) is a fix point of these coupled equations [34], where each individ-
ual player has no incentive to change his distribution, that is∑
a,o
P ∗(a)Q∗(o)U(a, o) ≥
∑
a,o
P (a)Q∗(o)U(a, o) ∀P (a)
∑
a,o
P ∗(a)Q∗(o)V (a, o) ≥
∑
a,o
P ∗(a)Q(o)V (a, o) ∀Q(o).
How such equilibria are reached is not subject in classic equilibrium game theory.
But, if such games are repeated over and over again, evolutionary game theory
suggests that these equilibria appear as fix points of adaptation dynamics like
the replicator equations [35]. As Bayesian inference can also be viewed as some
kind of replicator dynamics [36, 37], this provides an interesting starting point to
study the emergence of Nash equilibria when two adaptive Thompson sampling
agents interact.
When both agents are adaptive according to (11), we can decompose the
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policies P (a) and Q(o) into mixture distributions, such that
P (a) =
∑
θ
P (a|θ)P (θ)
Q(o) =
∑
ξ
Q(o|ξ)Q(ξ),
where P (a|θ) = BR1[Q(o)] and Q(o|ξ) = BR2[P (a)] and P (θ) and Q(ξ) are the
prior distributions over the possible behaviors. Moreover, both agents will have
predictive models over the other agent’s behavior, such that
P (o) =
∑
θ
P (o|θ)P (θ)
Q(a) =
∑
ξ
Q(a|ξ)Q(ξ),
where P (o|θ) = Q(o|ξ) and Q(a|ξ) = P (a|θ). In the following we will assume
that there exists at least one pair (θ∗, ξ∗) where the model P (o|θ∗) perfectly
matches Q(o|ξ∗) such that P (o|θ∗) = Q(o|ξ∗) and at the same time the model
Q(a|ξ∗) perfectly matches P (a|θ∗) such that P (a|θ∗) = Q(a|ξ∗). In this case
both agents can predict the other agent’s behavior, which means that there
will be no drive to change the posteriors P (θ|D) and Q(ξ|D), given some past
experience D. Then, both agents should “lock in” when their posteriors are
sufficiently close to δθ,θ∗ and δξ,ξ∗ . Formally, we define a pair (ξ
∗, θ∗) to be a
strict Nash equilibrium if
∑
o
Q(o|ξ∗) log Q(o|ξ
∗)
P (o|θ∗) <
∑
o
Q(o|ξ∗) log Q(o|ξ
∗)
P (o)
∀P (o)
∑
a
P (a|θ∗) log P (a|θ
∗)
Q(a|ξ∗) <
∑
o
P (a|θ∗) log P (a|θ
∗)
Q(a)
∀Q(a).
This corresponds to a lock-in of the predictive models that drive the adaptation
process.
In order to study convergence to (θ∗, ξ∗), we determine the difference in
relative entropy between the predictive distribution P (o) at time t and the
generative distribution Q(o|ξ∗) and the relative entropy between the predictive
distribution P (o|D) at time t+1 and the generative distribution Q(o|ξ∗)—after
observing D at time step t. This difference can serve as a Lyapunov function to
show convergence, if we require that
∆KL =
∑
D
Q(D|ξ∗)DKL (Q(o|ξ∗)‖P (o|D)) −DKL (Q(o|ξ∗)‖P (o)) < 0.
Given the predictive distribution P (o) =
∑
θ P (o|θ)P (θ) at time t and the
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predictive distribution P (o|D) =∑θ P (o|θ)P (θ|D) at time t+ 1, we get
∆KL =
∑
D
Q(D|ξ∗)
∑
o
Q(o|ξ∗)
[
log
Q(o|ξ∗)∑
θ P (o|θ)P (θ|D)
− log Q(o|ξ
∗)∑
θ P (o|θ)P (θ)
]
=
∑
D
Q(D|ξ∗)
∑
o
Q(o|ξ∗) log
∑
θ P (o|θ)P (θ)∑
θ P (o|θ)P (θ|D)
≤
∑
D
Q(D|ξ∗)
∑
o
Q(o|ξ∗)
[
log
∑
θ P (o|θ)P (θ)
P (o|θ∗)P (θ∗|D)
]
=
∑
o
Q(o|ξ∗) log
∑
θ P (o|θ)P (θ)
P (o|θ∗) −
∑
D
Q(D|ξ∗) logP (θ∗|D)
=
∑
o
Q(o|ξ∗) log
∑
θ P (o|θ)P (θ)
P (o|θ∗) −
∑
D
Q(D|ξ∗) log P (D|θ
∗)P (θ∗)∑
θ′ P (D|θ′)P (θ′)
=
∑
o
Q(o|ξ∗) log
∑
θ P (o|θ)P (θ)
P (o|θ∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0 (Nash property)
+
∑
D
Q(D|ξ∗) log
∑
θ′ P (D|θ′)P (θ′)
P (D|θ∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0 (Nash property)
− logP (θ∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
If the prior weight P (θ∗) is close to one then the last positive term − logP (θ∗) is
close to zero and the two other terms will dominate, making the whole expression
negative, thus, implying convergence. The argument can also be extended to
the case whereD is generated by
∑
ξ Q(D|ξ)Q(ξ) instead of Q(D|ξ∗), depending
again on the weight of Q(ξ∗) compared to the other weights Q(ξ), i.e. how close
the other agent is to the Nash policy. The same argument is then repeated for
player 2 who uses the prediction model Q(a|ξ) to model P (a|θ).
Consider as an example the matching pennies game [33], where each player
has a penny and must decide whether to secretely turn their penny to heads
or tails. Player 1 wins if both pennies show heads or both show tails, whereas
player 2 wins if the pennies are unmatched. The payoff matrices of the game
are (
(+1,−1) (−1,+1)
(−1,+1) (+1,−1)
)
,
where the first number in each cell is the payoff for player 1 and the second
number is the payoff for player 2, and the columns of the matrix correspond to
the choice of heads or tails of player 1, and the rows of the matrix correspond
to the choice of heads or tails of player 2. The best responses are then
P (a = H |θ) =


0 if θ < 1/2
1
2 if θ = 1/2
1 if θ > 1/2


and
Q(o = H |ξ) =


1 if ξ < 1/2
1
2 if ξ = 1/2
0 if ξ > 1/2


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Figure 1: Matching pennies game with two Thompson sampling agents. The
left figure shows the evolution of the mean of the posterior distributions over θ
and ξ for a single run. The right figure shows the average mean reward obtained
by each player.
and the predictive models are P (o|θ) = θ and Q(a|ξ) = ξ. For the priors
we assume the uniform distributions P (θ) = 1 and Q(ξ) = 1, such that the
posteriors are
P (θ; a1, a2) =
θa1−1(1− θ)a2−1
B(a1, a2)
and
Q(ξ; b1, b2) =
ξb1−1(1− ξ)b2−1
B(b1, b2)
,
where B(·, ·) is the beta function, and a1 and a2 is the number of heads and
tails played by player 2, whereas b1 and b2 is the number of heads and tails
played by player 1. In this case the only (θ∗, ξ∗) pair that is a Nash equilibrium
is in the 50 : 50 case, because only then do action and prediction model fit for
both agents. In each time step the agents sample θ and ξ respectively from their
posteriors P (θ|·) and Q(ξ|·) and act with their best response to this sample. In
Figure 4 it can be seen how they co-adapt and converge to the Nash equilibrium.
5 Causal induction
Agent (11) can be thought of as a probabilistic superposition of models θ, where
each model θ is characterized by a likelihood model P (ot|θ, ao<tat) and a pol-
icy model P (at|θ, ao<t). In previous applications we assumed that all models θ
have the same causal structure, i.e. considering multivariate random variables
at and ot, we assumed that the same variables at are intervened for all θ and
the same causal model is used to predict the consequences of these interven-
tions on the observational variables ot. However, this need not be the case.
In principle, different models θ could represent different causal structures and
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suggest intervention of different variables. Such a setup can be used for causal
induction.
Imagine, for example, we are given a device with two light bulbs, one green
(X) and one red (Y ), whose states obey a hidden mechanism that correlates
them positively. Moreover, the device has switches that allow us controlling the
state of either bulb.. We encode the “on” and “off” states of the green light
as X = x and X = ¬x respectively. Analogously, Y = y and Y = ¬y denote
the “on” and “off” states of the red light. We are interested in the explanatory
power of two competing hypotheses: either “green causes red” (Θ = θ) or “red
causes green” (Θ = ¬θ).
One of the main methods to deal with problems of causal inference is the
framework of causal graphical models [29]. Given a graph that represents a
causal structure, we can intervene this graph and ask questions about the prob-
abilities of the variables in the graph. However, in causal induction we would
like to discover the causal structure itself, that is we would like to do inference
over a multitude of graphs representing different causal structures [38]. If one
would like to represent the problem of causal discovery graphically, the main
challenge is that the model Θ is a random variable that controls the causal
structure itself. That is, a tentative graphical representation would be
X Y Y X
Θ meta-level
which cannot be analyzed using the mathematical framework of graphical mod-
els alone because the random variable Θ operates on a meta-level of the graphical
model over X and Y . In fact, different causal structures have to be investigated
by different graphical models, that is the inference process over different causal
structures cannot be represented in one and the same graphical model. However,
this difficulty can be overcome by using a probability tree to model the causal
structure over the random events [39]. Probability trees can encode alternative
causal realizations, and in particular alternative causal hypotheses [40]. All ran-
dom variables are then of the same type—no distinctions between meta-levels
are needed.
Representation
We can use probability trees to represent the prediction model that the agent
has about its environment. An exemplary probability tree for our problem is
depicted in Figure 2. In this tree, each (internal) node is interpreted as a causal
mechanism; hence a path from the root node to one of the leaves corresponds to
a particular sequential realization of causal mechanisms. The logic underlying
the structure of this tree is as follows:
1. Causal precedence: A node causally precedes its descendants. For in-
stance, the root node corresponding to the sure event Ω causally precedes
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Figure 2: a) An exemplary probability tree to represent the agent’s prediction
model about its environment. The probability of a realization (written under
the leaves) is calculated by multiplying the probabilities starting from the root
until a leave is reached. Note that the two hypotheses are statistically indistin-
guishable. b) The probability tree resulting from (a) after setting X = x.
all other nodes.
2. Resolution of variables: Each node resolves the value of a random variable.
For instance, given the node corresponding to Θ = θ and X = ¬x, either
Y = y will happen with probability Pr(y|θ,¬x) = 14 or Y = ¬y with
probability Pr(¬y|θ,¬x) = 34 .
3. Heterogeneous order: The resolution order of random variables can vary
across different branches. For instance, X precedes Y under Θ = θ, but
Y precedes X under Θ = ¬θ. This allows modeling different causal hy-
potheses.
While the probability tree represents our subjective model explaining the order
in which the random values are resolved, it does not necessarily correspond to
the temporal order in which the events are revealed to us. So for instance, under
hypothesis Θ = θ, the value of the variable Y might be revealed before X , even
though X causally precedes Y ; and the hypothesis Θ, which precedes both X
and Y , is never observed.
Interventions
The importance of interventions to detect causal structure is illustrated in Fig-
ure 2, as the observational probabilities are completely symmetric for the two
halves of the tree. Suppose we observe that both lights are on. Have we learned
anything about their causal dependency? A brief calculation shows that this is
not the case because the posterior probabilities are equal to the prior probabil-
ities:
Pr(θ|x, y) =
Pr(y|θ, x)Pr(x|θ)Pr(θ)
Pr(y|θ, x)Pr(x|θ)Pr(θ) +Pr(x|¬θ, y)Pr(y|¬θ)Pr(¬θ)
=
3
4
· 1
2
· 1
2
3
4
· 1
2
· 1
2
+ 3
4
· 1
2
· 1
2
=
1
2
= Pr(θ).
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This makes sense intuitively, because by just observing that the two lights are
on, it is statistically impossible to tell which one caused the other. The only way
to extract causal information is then to intervene, paraphrased as “no causes in,
no causes out” [41] or “to find out what happens when you kick the system, you
have to kick the system” [42]. Thus, we now repeat our experiment, but this
time we turn on the green light (X = x). We reflect this choice by changing all
the mechanisms that resolve the random variable X , placing all the probability
mass on the outcome X = x (see Figure 2b). Assume that we subsequently
observe that the second light is on. Then, the posterior probabilities are
Pr(θ|xˆ, y) =
Pr(y|θ, xˆ)Pr(xˆ|θ)Pr(θ)
Pr(y|θ, xˆ)Pr(xˆ|θ)Pr(θ) +Pr(xˆ|¬θ, y)Pr(y|¬θ)Pr(¬θ)
=
3
4
· 1 · 1
2
3
4
· 1 · 1
2
+ 1 · 1
2
· 1
2
=
3
5
,
where xˆ is Pearl’s notation to indicate a causal intervention of X . Since P (θ) <
P (θ|xˆ, y), we have gathered evidence favoring the hypothesis “green causes red”.
This was only possible because our intervention introduced a statistical asym-
metry among the two hypotheses that did not exist before.
Thompson Sampling
Naturally, multiple interventions and observations can be executed in consecu-
tion. In this case Thompson sampling is used in each time step to decide which
policy model to use, which implies the decision which variables to intervene.
Then, after the intervention, all variables are revealed simultaneously at every
time step of the inference process. The update of the observational probabilities
is done the same way as in the one step case, taking into account which variables
were intervened. A simulation of the repeated Thompson sampling process for
causal induction of our example system is shown in Figure 3.
6 Discussion
Equations (11) was first derived in [17] as the optimal solution to the adaptive
coding problem given actions and observations as Bayesian rule for control. In
practice, it is implemented by sampling an environment parameter θˆt for each
time step from the posterior distribution B(θ|aˆ<t, o<t), and then treating it as if
it was the true parameter—that is, issuing the action at from B(at|θˆt, a<t, o<t).
This action-sampling method where beliefs are randomly instantiated was first
proposed as a heuristic in [1] and is now known as Thompson sampling. Equa-
tions (11) therefore provides a method for generalized Thompson sampling ap-
plicable to adaptive sequential decision-making problems.
The main contribution of this paper is to examine three features of such
generalized Thompson sampling. First, we provide an argument showing that
Thompson sampling is a natural consequence of a Bayesian treatment of pol-
icy uncertainty. Policy uncertainty arises whenever an agent is trying to find
an optimal policy, but is unable to do so—for example due to computational
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Figure 3: Thompson sampling for causal induction. (Left) Posterior distribution
P (θ|·) for 10 runs when the true system is given by Θ = θ. (Right) Posterior
distribution P (θ|·) for 10 runs when the true system is given by Θ = ¬θ. In
both cases the agent is able to identify the causal structure of the environment
with high confidence when P (θ| · · · ) is close to one or zero respectively.
constraints—, even though the agent might have a coarse idea about the op-
timum, which can be expressed as a probability distribution. The Bayesian
treatment of this uncertainty is analogous to Bayesian estimation in the case
of pure observation problems. The Bayes-optimal estimator in this case is not
point estimate, but a distribution, which forgoes the bias-variance dilemma.
Similarly, in the case of actions, the exploration-exploitation trade-off can be
circumvented by Thompson sampling from probabilistic policies expressed as
Bayesian mixture distributions.
Second, we investigated co-adaptation of two adaptive Thompson sampling
agents. We could demonstrate that such agents converge to Nash equilibria, if
the parameterized policy set they are choosing from is given by the parameter-
ized best response functions. This approach also generalizes previous models
of fictitious play [43, 44] that best-respond to the observed frequency of the
opponent’s play rather than best-responding to their randomized beliefs about
the opponent. Therefore, adaptive Thompson sampling agents might provide a
useful modeling tool for evolutionary game theory [35] and learning in games in
general [45].
Third, we could demonstrate that generalized Thompson sampling can also
be applied to the problem of causal induction, by designing policy and predic-
tion models with different causal structures. This way generalized Thompson
sampling can be used as a general method for causal induction that is Bayesian
in nature. It is based on the idea of combining probability trees [40] with inter-
ventions [29] for predicting the behavior of a manipulated system with multiple
causal hypotheses. Both the interventions and the constraints on the causal hy-
potheses introduce statistical asymmetries that permit the extraction of causal
information. Unlike frameworks that aim to extract causal information from ob-
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servational data alone [46, 47, 48], the proposed method is designed for agents
that interact with their environment and use these interactions to discover causal
relationships.
So far Thompson sampling has been mainly applied to multi-armed bandit
problems. Multi-armed bandits can be represented by a parameter θ that sum-
marizes the statistical properties of the reward obtained for each lever. Reward
distributions range from Bernoulli to Gaussian (with unknown mean and vari-
ance), and they can also depend on the particular context or state [9, 11, 8, 10].
In particular, the work of [11] and the work of [8] prove asymptotic convergence
of Thompson sampling. The work of [12] presents empirical results that show
Thompson sampling is highly competitive, matching or outperforming popular
methods such as UCB [25, 26].
Another class of problems, where Thompson sampling has been applied in
the past, are Markov decision processes (MDPs). MDPs can be described by
parameterizing the dynamics and reward distribution (model-based) [49] or by
directly parameterizing the Q-table (model-free) [50, 31]. The first approach
samples a full description of an MDP, solves it for the optimal policy, and then
issues the optimal action. This is repeated in each time step. The second
approach avoids the computational overhead of solving for the optimal policy in
each time step by directly doing inference on the Q-tables. Actions are chosen
by picking the one having the highest Q-value for the current state. The same
ideas can also be applied to solve adaptive control problems with linear system
equations, quadratic cost functions and Gaussian noise [51].
6.1 Optimality
One of the main arguments is that the derivation presented in Section 3.3 shows
that generalized Thompson sampling is not just a heuristic method, but that it
can be derived under the assumption of policy uncertainty—simply by applying
probability theory and causal calculus. This Thompson sampling approach dif-
fers from the formulation of adaptive control problems as control problems with
known environments that require the maximization of a subjective expected util-
ity criterion—compare Section 2.3. The difference between the two approaches
can be highlighted by contrasting the two one-step decision scenarios depicted in
Figure 4. The goal is to predict the outcome of a biases coin with payoffs $1 and
$0 for a right and wrong guess respectively. A rational decision maker places
bets (shown inside speech bubbles) such that his subjective expected utility is
maximized. These subjective beliefs are delimited within dotted boxes.
The difference between the two becomes clear by inspecting the expected
utility in each case: they are
max
P ′
∑
θ
P (θ)
{∑
o
P ′(a|θ)P (o|θ, a)U(o)
}
, (a)
and
∑
θ
P (θ)max
P ′
{∑
o
P ′(a|θ)P (o|θ, a)U(o)
}
(b)
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Figure 4: Comparison between (a) a fully rational decision maker and (b) a
decision maker with random beliefs.
respectively. Here it is clearly seen that the difference between the two lies in
the order in which we apply the expectation (over the environment parameter)
and the maximization operator. Both cases can be explained in terms of opti-
mality. However, in (a), decision-maker picks his action taking into account the
uncertainty over the bias, while in (b), the decision-maker picks his action only
after his beliefs over the coin bias are instantiated—that is, he is optimal w.r.t.
his random beliefs.
The difference between probabilities that one takes into account when mak-
ing a decision versus the probabilities that are not (i.e. they are immeasur-
able) has been first proposed by [52]. The classical decision theories of [18]
and [19] only consider known probabilities that are reasoned about inside the
max-operation. Another example where random beliefs play a crucial role is in
games with incomplete information [33]. Here, having incomplete information
about the other player leads to a infinite hierarchy of meta-reasoning about the
other player’s strategy. To avoid this difficulty, Harsanyi introduced Bayesian
games [53]. In a Bayesian game, incomplete knowledge is modeled by ran-
domly instantiating the player’s types, after which they choose their strategies
optimally—thus eliminating the need for recurrent reasoning about the other
players’ strategy.
Maintaining and updating Bayesian probabilities is an optimally efficient
way to deal with uncertainty—be it with respect to the policy or the envi-
ronment [31]. Therefore, the central claim is that having random beliefs—as
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formalized by generalized Thompson sampling—can be considered optimal un-
der the constraint of having policy uncertainty—uncertainty that is inevitable
whenever we are unable to compute the optimal policy. Having policy uncer-
tainty effectively weakens the two assumptions of the maximum expected utility
principle: the optimal policy can be chosen and refined during interactions, and
the computational complexity is lower.
The operational distinction of having policy uncertainty has important al-
gorithmic consequences. When there is policy uncertainty, the belief of the
decision-maker is itself a random variable. This means that the very policy
is undefined until the random variable is resolved. Hence, the computation of
the optimal policy can be delayed and determined dynamically. It is precisely
this fact that is (implicitly) exploited in popular reinforcement learning algo-
rithms, and explicitly in the algorithms based on random beliefs. This is in
stark contrast to the case when there is no policy uncertainty, where the policy
is pre-computed and static.
Adaptive Coding and the Kullback-Leibler Divergence
Even though the maximization is inside the expectation in case of random be-
lief approaches to decision-making, there is another outer maximization or op-
timality criterion implicit, analogous to the case of Bayesian inference that is
known to optimize Kullback-Leibler divergences. Therefore, it is useful to think
about the adaptive control problem as an adaptive coding and inference prob-
lem [17, 54]. In terms of the initial problem statement in Section 2, the question
then is: How can the designer construct a system P defined by P (ot|a≤t, o<t)
and P (at|a<t, o<t) such that its behavior is as close as possible to the custom-
made system B(ot|θ, a≤t, o<t) and B(at|θ, a<t, o<t) under any realization of Qθ?
Using the Kullback-Leibler divergence as a distance measure, we can formulate
a variational problem in P
P := argmin
Pr
{
lim sup
t→∞
∑
θ
P (θ)
t∑
τ=1
(
Daτm (Pr) +D
oτ
m (Pr)
)}
(12)
with
Datθ (Pr) =
∑
a<t,o<t
B(a<t, o<t|θ)
∑
at
B(at|θ, a<t, o<t) log B(at|θ, a<t, o<t)
Pr(at|a<t, o<t)
Dotθ (Pr) =
∑
a≤t,o<t
B(a≤t, o<t|θ)
∑
ot
B(ot|θ, a≤t, o<t) log B(ot|θ, a≤t, o<t)
Pr(ot|a≤t, o<t) .
In the case of observations, this is a well-known variational principle for Bayesian
inference, as it describes a predictor that requires, on average, the least amount
of extra bits to capture informational surprise stemming from the behavior of
the environment. In the case of actions, the same principle can be harnessed
to describe resourceful generation of actions in a way that requires random bits
with minimum length on average, when trying to match the optimal policy most
suitable for the unknown environment [55].
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6.2 Evolutionary game theory
When dealing with adaptive agents, one of the most intriguing questions is
what happens if two adaptive agents are coupled. Classic game theory does
not really allow to address that question, as it abstracts away from learning
and adaptation processes and focuses on fix point conditions for equilibria. In
contrast, evolutionary game theory focuses on the dynamics that can lead to
equilibria [35]. One of the most widely studied dynamics in evolutionary game
theory are the so-called replicator equations
xit+1 =
xitfi(x)∑
j x
j
tfj(x)
,
where xit represents the proportion of type i in a population of individuals at
time t. The vector xt = (x
1
t , . . . , x
n
t ) represents the population distribution,
such that
∑
j x
j
t = 1. The function fi(x) denotes the fitness of type i, which
depends on the population x. The proportion of individuals of type i at the next
time point t+ 1 is determined by the fitness share this type achieves compared
to the population total.
Interestingly, there is a formal correspondence between the replicator dy-
namics and Bayesian inference [36, 37]
p(h|d) = p(h)p(d|h)∑
h′ p(h
′)p(d|h′) ,
where p(h) and p(h|d) represents the prior and posterior probability mass allot-
ted to hypothesis h. The likelihood function p(d|h) works as a fitness landscape.
The posterior probability is determined by the likelihood fitness achieved com-
pared to the overall evidence P (d) =
∑
h′ p(h
′)p(d|h′).
In evolutionary game theory the fix points of the replicator dynamics have
been studied extensively. In particular, evolutionarily stable strategies [56] have
been shown to be a refinement of the common Nash equilibrium, in the sense
that such Nash equilibria are stable with respect to perturbing mutant strate-
gies. Since generalized Thompson sampling as described in (11) shares its form
with Bayesian inference, the connection to evolutionary replicator equations is
immediate. Therefore, we could apply very similar stability arguments in the
case of two interacting adaptive agents (11), as previously applied in the case
of the replicator dynamics. Generalized Thompson sampling might therefore
also provide a useful tool in the future to study convergence of co-adaptation
processes within the context of evolutionary game theory.
6.3 Causality
To construct the Bayes-causal solution in Section 3.3, we needed to treat actions
as interventions. This raises the question about why this distinction was not
made for deriving classical SEU solutions. More formally, under what conditions
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do the equations in (11) reduce to
P (at|a<t, o<t) = B(at|a<t, o<t)
P (ot|a≤t, o<t) = B(ot|a≤t, o<t),
that is, with no interventions?
Since,
B(at|a<t, o<t) =
∑
θ
B(at|θ, a<t, o<t)B(θ|aˆ<t, o<t)
B(ot|a≤t, o<t) =
∑
θ
B(ot|θ, a≤t, o<t)B(θ|aˆ≤t, o<t),
determining the conditions boils down to analyzing when the equalities
B(θ|a<t, o<t) = B(θ|aˆ<t, o<t)
B(θ|aˆ≤t, o<t) = B(θ|a≤t, o<t)
hold. Replacing both sides yields,
B(θ)
∏t
k=1B(ak|θ, a<k, o<k)B(ok|θ, a≤k, o<k)∑
θ′ B(θ
′)
∏t
k=1 B(ak|θ′, a<k, o<k)B(ok|θ′, a≤k, o<k)
=
B(θ)
∏t
k=1B(ok|θ, a≤k, o<k)∑
θ′ B(θ
′)
∏t
k=1 B(ok|θ′, a≤k, o<k)
(13)
Inspecting (13) we conclude that
B(ak|θ, a<k, o<k) = δa¯k(ak),
i.e. the actions have to be issued deterministically (but possibly history-dependent)
from a unique policy. Intuitively speaking, this is because the operations of inter-
vening and conditioning coincide when the random variables are deterministic.
6.4 Open Problems
There are important cases where random belief approaches can fail. Indeed, it
is easy to devise experiments where having policy uncertainty converges expo-
nentially slower (or does not converge at all) than knowing the optimal policy.
Consider the following simple example: Environment 1 is a k-state MDP in
which only k consecutive actions A reach a state with reward +1. Any inter-
ception with a B-action leads back to the initial state. A second environment
which is like the first but actions A and B are interchanged. The optimal policy
figures out the true environment in k actions (either k consecutive A’s or B’s).
Consider now an agent with random beliefs: The optimal action in environ-
ment 1 is A, in environment 2 is B. A uniform (12 ,
1
2 ) prior over the two possible
environments stays a uniform posterior as long as no reward has been observed.
Hence, an agent with random beliefs chooses at each time-step A and B with
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equal probability. With this policy it takes about 2k actions to accidentally
choose a row of A’s (or B’s) of length k. From then on the agent acts optimally
too. Thus, the optimal policy converges in time k, while the agent with policy
uncertainty needs exponentially longer. A simple way to remedy this problem
is, of course, to sample random beliefs only every k time steps. But this prob-
lem can be exacerbated in non-stationary environments. Take for instance, an
increasing MDP with k =
⌈
10
√
t
⌉
, in which the optimal policy converges in 100
steps, while an agent with policy uncertainty would not converge at all in most
realizations.
Although [17] prove asymptotic convergence for general environments fulfill-
ing a restrictive form of ergodicity condition, this condition needs to be weak-
ened for the convergence proof to be applicable to most real problems. But it is
clear that a form of ergodicity is required for an agent with policy uncertainty
to be able to learn to act optimally. Intuitively, this means that an agent can
only learn if the environment has temporally stable statistical properties. Fi-
nally, determining the speed of convergence and the regret is currently an open
problem.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have argued that policy uncertainty is a natural phenomenon
that arises whenever there are not enough computational resources to apply
the maximum SEU principle. We have shown that treating this uncertainty
in a Bayesian way with actions as random variables that obey causal calculus
naturally leads to Thompson sampling and its Bayesian generalization. This
generalized Thompson sampling can be straightforwardly applied to evolution-
ary game theory and to the problem of causal induction. As these random-belief
approaches can be derived simply from probability theory and causal calculus
we suggest that they should not be considered as mere heuristics but as well-
founded principled approaches.
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